Abstract-A program required to be tested in practice often has no available source code for some reason and how to adequately test such a program is still an open problem. In this paper, we describe a formal specification-based testing approach to tackle this challenge. The principal idea is first to formalize the informal requirements into formal operation specifications that take the interface scenarios of the program into account, and then utilize the specifications for test case generation and test result analysis. An example and case study of applying the approach to an Ie card system is presented to illustrate its usage and analyze its performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Programs required to be tested in practice often have no source code for some reasons (e.g., confidentiality) but testing such programs is necessary and important for software quality assurance in industry. A traditional approach to dealing with this problem is black-box testing (or functional testing) [1] , but how to carry out an adequate black-box testing in this situation still remains a challenge.
The central issue in tackling this problem is how to make the tester thoroughly understand the desired functionality of the program under testing. One way is to discover it from the requirements that are usually written informally, but due to the ambiguities of the requirements, this may not be easily achieved. Another possibility is to use some test cases to run the program to detect the input-output relations. Each input-output relation can be reflected by a program interface trace, which we call an interface scenario. Each interface scenario indicates the implementation of a functional scenario (a sequence of operations), but it does not provide a complete definition of the functional scenario due to the fact that the test cases do not cover all necessary input values for the implementation of the functional scenario.
In this paper, we describe an approach to using formal ization to help a tester understand the desired functionality of the program, and to build a firm foundation for testing the program. Specifically, our approach suggests that the requirements be formalized into a set of formal operation specifications whose signatures are constructed based on the program interface scenarios. The formalization will force the tester to draw an accurate, complete, and precise picture about the desired behaviors of the program and to prepare a solid foundation for testing. We focus on the descriptions of how the interface scenarios of a program are derived, how the formal operation specification is constructed, and how a testing is carried out based upon the formal specification.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as fo llows. Section II describes the essential ideas of the testing approach and the process of testing. Section III discusses how to formalize the informal requirements based upon the program interface scenarios. Section IV focuses on the test case generation and test result analysis. Section V presents an example to illustrate how our approach is applied to test an IC Card software. Section VI introduces the related work and compares it with our approach. Finally, in Section VII we conclude the paper and point out future research directions.
II. ESSENTIAL IDE AS
The essential ideas of our approach is first to formalize the requirements and then to carry out a testing. When formalizing the requirements, we abstract the program under testing into a set of operations, each defining an independent service, such as Withdraw or Deposit in an automated telling machine (ATM) software. The goal of the formalization is therefore to write a formal specification for each operation. To this end, we need to determine the signature of each operation, including the input variables, output variables, and the related external variables (or state variables). This signature is expected to be consistent with the interface of the program in order to ensure that test cases generated from the specification can be directly adopted to test the program. Since there might be a gap between the informal requirements and the interface of the program, it is usually difficult to achieve the consistency without examining the program. However, since the source code of the program is not available (assumed), it is impossible to examine the implementation details. The only information about the program we can grasp is its interface scenarios and its dynamic behaviors when it is executed. For this reason, our approach suggests that the formation of each operation's signature takes the interface scenarios of the program into account. As far as defining the functionality of the operation is concerned, we use pre-and post-conditions, the most commonly applied notation in the literature [2], to specify it, based on the informal requirements, as shown in an example later.
An interface scenario of the program is represented by a sequence of inputs and the corresponding output of the program. It can be identified by executing the program using sample inputs, but the precise relation between the sequence of inputs and the output is unknown. The goal of testing is to identify whether such a relation is implemented correctly in B   I  I  I  \  \  \  ,  ,  , The whole process of testing using our approach is illustrated in Figure 1 .
III. CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS
The construction of a formal specification for the program under testing takes the following three steps: 1) Find all of the functional scenarios described in the informal requirements, where each functional scenario describes an independent, desired function in terms of the input-output relation. 2) Form an operation to define all of the identified func tional scenarios, but the signature of the operation must be formed based on both the requirements and the interface scenarios of the corresponding program. 3) Write the pre-and post-conditions for the operation using a formal specification language. Next, we discuss these three issues, respectively.
A. Finding functional scenarios
The first step is to find all of the functional scenarios from the requirements description. This can be done by reviewing and analyzing the informal requirements specification. We define each identified functional scenario as a single operation.
Let us consider a simplified ATM system as an example. Suppose the informal requirements for the system are given in Figure 2 and we want to find all of functional scenarios. We analyze the document to identify the relevant requirements and highlight the related text segments using the bold italic font, as indicated in the figure. Through the analysis, we realize that this functional scenario is concerned with withdrawing money from a bank account. Therefore, we form an operation and name it Withdraw. Applying the same principle, all of other functional scenarios can be identified and defined as appropriate operations.
A software system for a simplified Automated Teller Machine (A TM) needs to provide two services for customers. The services include withdrawing nwney from the customer's bank account and inquiry for the account balance. To withdraw nwney, the customer's card and password as well as the requested anwunt are required. The bank policy does not allow overdraft when the service for withdrawal is used. For an inquiry about the customer's account balance, the system should provide the current balance of the customer's account. 
B. Identifying interface scenarios
The next step is to determine the signature of the operation. As discussed previously, this signature needs to be kept con sistent with that of the program in order to facilitate the direct adoption of test cases to be generated from the specification. To this end, we need to identify the corresponding interface scenarios when the program is executed. For this purpose, we can select test cases from relevant types randomly. During the execution of the program, we continue to supply test cases if they are required by the program (e.g., via its GU!). Such an activity continues until the final execution result is provided. Since this technique is not aimed at really testing the program but at finding potential interface scenarios, the test cases needed should be as merely necessary as possible.
Assume that we have obtained all interface scenarios, the next issue is how to represent them so that they will present a clear guideline for the formalization of the corresponding functional requirements. We adopt the following finite state machine (FSM) notation for this purpose. marked with a black dot at the top, is the initial state, representing the top page of the GUI of the ATM system, and the states s4 and s5 are both final states which are deliberately drawn in broken line circles. The FSM describes two interface scenarios. One is the scenario for withdrawing money from the bank account, and another is to show the account balance. The scenario for withdrawing money starts from the initial state sO. When correct user's card _id and password are provided, which is denoted by symbol cp, the state will transfer to sl;
3. An example of the finite state machine for a simplified ATM otherwise, if any of them is incorrect, denoted by symbol -cp, the state will transfer to state s2 and will return to state sO. At the state sl, if the input symbol is w (denoting the withdraw command), the state will transfer to state s3; otherwise, the state will transfer to the final state s4 denoting the final page of QUI in which the requested account balance is shown. At state s3, if the requested amount less than the account balance is provided, denoted by am, the state will transfer to the final state s5; otherwise, if the amount is greater than the account balance, the state will transfer to state s6, and then returns to state s3 for re-input of appropriate amount.
In the context of the FSM, an interface scenario is in fact defined as a set of state transition sequences. Each sequence has the form: [sO, sl, s2, ... , snJ, where sO must be the initial state of the FSM and sn must be a final state. For example, the scenario for withdrawal discussed above is defined by the set of state transition sequences: Obviously, this interface scenario is infinite, but the input val ues associated with the state transitions can be classified into a finite set based on which corresponding input variables can be declared in the signature of the corresponding operation. For example, three input variables for representing inputs card_id, password, and withdrawal amount can be declared for the signature of the withdraw operation. As a result, the operation has the following format:
process Withdraw(card_id : string, password: natO, amount: natO) cash: nat I error_message: string end_process where the output variables cash and error _message are created for the need of writing the formal specification.
The operation contains three input variables card _id, password, and amount. The card _id is a string, and both password and amount are a natural number (including zero).
The output of the operation has two exclusive possibilities: ei ther cash or error _message. The pre-and post-conditions of the operation are empty at the moment, but will be completed in the next step. The operation is written in the SOFL formal specification language [3] for the sake of our expertise. SOFL is an extension of VDM-SL [4] to have more capability for modelling of practical systems. Note that in spite of using SOFL for discussion, our approach presented in this paper is independent of specification languages; it can be applied to any formal notation using pre-and post-conditions.
C. Construction of Formal Specifications
Having understood all of the implemented interface sce narios, the next key issue is how to formally define the identified functional scenarios as operation specifications. As mentioned in Section III-A, the potential behavior of each operation can be derived from the informal requirements, but the understanding of it may remain limited due to the ambiguities of the informal expressions. Writing a formal specification for the operation can force the tester to consider every possible aspect and to establish a firm foundation for testing. The key issue in writing the formal specification is how to provide appropriate pre-and post-conditions for the operation.
This can be done by analyzing the corresponding functional scenario. We first target on the post-condition because it focuses on the function of the operation by defining the relation between input and output. During this process, we may find that some state variables (or external variables as we call in both VDM and SOFL) are necessary for expressing the post condition. We then try to figure out the pre-condition to ensure that the post-condition defines a valid final state when the pre condition is satisfied by an initial state. Consider the operation acc.balance -amount) } not (amount:::; ace. balance) and bound(error _message) and accounts = -accounts end J lrocess where the logical operator "and" is used for 1\ and "or" for V.
In this specification, an external variable accounts is de clared. This variable is used to hold a set of customers' bank accounts, each being a member of the type Account that is declared as a composite type with three fields: card _id, password, and balance. The pre-condition requires the existence of a unique account in accounts such that its card_id and password are the same as the input card_id and password, respectively. The post-condition defines two cases:
one is for a successful withdrawal and the other is a failed withdrawal. When the requested amount is not greater than the balance, the withdrawal will be successful and the requested amount will be delivered, which is denoted by the variable cash. The balance will also be updated in the account to reflect the reduction of the requested amount. On the other hand, when the withdrawal is failed (Le., the amount is greater than or equal to the account balance), an error message denoted by the variable error_message is provided. For testing purpose, we are not interested in the specific content of the error message implemented by the program, therefore, we use the expression bound(error _message) in the post-condition to mean that error _message is made available but its content is unknown.
IV. TE ST CASE GENERATION AND RESULT ANALYSIS
The goal of testing is to check whether each specification scenario defined in the specification is correctly implemented by the program. Theoretically, for any specification scenario, there should be an implementation scenario in the program to correctly implement it if the program refines the specification. A natural criterion for test case generation is therefore to let the generated test cases cover all the specification scenarios. To ensure the completeness and feasibility of the operation speci fication, a basic requirement for the operation is that its speci fication must be well-formed, which is formally defined below.
To keep the definition concise, we let S(Siv, Sov) [Spre, Spost] denote the specification of operation S, where Siv is the set of all the input variables whose values are not changed by the operation, Sov is a set of all the output variables whose values are produced or updated by the operation, and Spre and Spost are the pre-and postconditions of S, respectively.
Definition 2: Let S(Siv, Sov)[Spre, Spost] denote the spec ification of operation S, where Siv is the set of all the input variables, Sov is the set of all the output variables, and Spre and Spost are the pre-and post-conditions of S, respectively. Let the post-condition Spost == (C1 1\ Dd V (C2 1\ D2) V .. . V (Cn 1\ Dn) where (n � 1), Ci (i = L.n) is a guard condition and Di is a defining condition. Let T be a test set. Then, T is said to satisfy the scenario-coverage of S iff V i E{1, ... , n }3 t ET· Spre( t ) 1\ Ci( t ) .
A test set T, which is a collection of test cases, satisfies the scenario-coverage for specification S iff for any specification scenario in the post-condition, there exists a test case in T such that it satisfies both the pre-condition of S and the guard condition of the scenario. Such a test set T ensures that the corresponding implementation of every specification scenario is tested. However, since the implementation may be composed of many execution paths, the test set T may not guarantee to traverse all the corresponding paths. To deal with this problem, we take a gradual dividing method for the selection of more test cases. Let (CiI\Di) be a specification scenario of operation S. Then, by this method we divide the sub-domain, defined by the conjunction Spre 1\ Ci, into smaller sub-domains, say E1, E2, ... , Eq (q > 1), and select a test case from each sub-domain Ej (j E {l, 2, ... , q}) to expand the test set T.
Continuously apply this method until all the execution paths are traversed or some stop-testing condition is satisfied.
Let us take the operation Withdraw as an example. To meet the Criterion 2, we need to generate a test set T that covers the following two specification scenarios derived from the operation specification:
Applying this concept to the operation Withdraw above, we can easily conclude that Withdraw is a well-formed specification, because its post-condition can be translated into the following disjunction:
(1) (exists! [ace: accounts] I ace. card id = card id and acc.password = password) and ace inset accounts and ace. card id = card id and --acc.password = password and amount <= ace. balance) and (cash = amount and accounts = union(dif fCaccounts, {ace}) , {modify(acc, balance-> ace. balance -amount) }) (2) (exists! [ace: accounts] I ace. card id = card id and acc.password = password) and ace inset accounts and ace. card id = card id and acc.password = password and not (amount <= acc.balance) ) and (bound(error _message) and accounts = -accounts) where the let expression is translated into the equivalent conjunction:
ace inset accounts and ace. card id = card id and acc.password = password.
Each test case consists of four values for the four input vari ables (i.e., the three parameters card_id, password, amount, and one external variable accounts). Figure 4 shows a test set generated for testing the function of the operation Withdraw .
The test case on the first row allows us to test the situation where both the inputs card _id and password are correct and the input amount is less than the customer's account balance. The test case on the second row checks the situation where both the card _id and password are correct, but the amount exceeds the balance. The one on the third row tests the situation where the pre-condition of the operation is not satisfied because of the inconsistency between the input password and the registered password in the customer's account. Since the pre-condition is treated as an assumption for the operation, the last test case will not necessarily help find errors, but it will allow the tester to understand how the implementation deals with this situation and to provide a feedback to the programmer for potential improvement.
Assume that we obtain the actual execution result R for the test case on the first row in Figure 4 denoted by Tl, which consists of two values: updated accounts and cash. We substitute them for the variables accounts and cash in the post-condition, respectively, and evaluate the following implication:
Withdraw p re(Tl) =} Withdraw p ost(Tl, R) If the result is true, it means that no error is found by Tl; otherwise, it indicates the presence of some errors in the program. Similarly, we can also perform the test result analysis for the other two test cases, which we omit here for brevity.
V. AN EXAMPLE
We have applied our approach to test an IC Card software system developed by a group of senior students at Hosei University. The system is intended to provide three services: operations on ATM, purchase of railway tickets, and payment for shopping. The operations on ATM includes withdraw, deposit, show balance, transfer money, and change password. For purchasing railway tickets, the system provides the opera tions: purchase a ticket, charge the card with cash, charge the card from the customer's bank account, show balance of the card (i.e., the amount of money available in the buffer of the card), and use the card (for entering and existing a station). The payment for shopping is a service that allows one to pay for the goods purchased at shops using the card. It includes the following specific functions: check card validity, check amount restrictions (e.g., a card cannot be used for shopping of more than a fixed amount in Japanese yen per day at the same shop), authenticate the card user, and pay for shopping.
Since the whole example is too large to be put in a paper gracefully, we choose only the ATM sub-system as an example to show how our testing approach can be applied. As the ATM example in Section III-C is a simplified version of the system we use in this section, the contents of this section would be understood easily.
A. Application Figure 5 shows a snapshot of the QUI scenario for an unsuccessful withdrawal from a customer's bank account. The first page of the QUI for the system shows three choices: ATM System, ShoppingSystem, and TransportationSystems. Clicking on the button named ATMSystem, the system transfers from the first page to the ATM QUI page given at the upper-right of the figure. Clicking on the button named Withdraw, the QUI changes to the page requesting a card_id and a password, which is given at the bottom-right of the figure. When a wrong password is input, the system moves to the page displaying an error message and requesting the user to re-enter the password. Clicking on the "yes" button (the left one), the system returns to the page requesting for a card _id and a password.
Using random testing based on a programmer's brief de scription of the interface scenarios of the system, we built a set of FSMs for the ATM system for simplicity and readability, as shown in Figure 6 , each describing a single independent interface scenario, as indicated in the figure. Taking the same approach as we explained in Section III, we construct an operation specification in pre-and post-conditions for each functional scenario. For the sake of both space and the similar ity to the simplified ATM example, we omit the specifications here. We carried out testing of the program based upon the specifications to verify whether the desired behaviors are im plemented correctly. There were about 27 defects found as the result, but the main defects that lead to major functional errors with respect to the functional requirements in the specifications are three, which are illustrated as follows:
• In the specification the cash card and password are required to provide before any service (e.g., balance inquiry, withdraw) starts, but the implementation in the program puts the selection of services before the input of card id and password. The purpose of such a requirement is to prevent people without cash card from trying to "play" with the ATM system.
• In the Withdraw service, if the requested amount is over the account balance, the customer should be given two choices: giving up the use of the service or re-entering the amount for withdrawal, but the implementation in the program insists only on re-entering the amount. The same error is also found in the Transfer service: when the amount for transferring is over the account balance, the program insists only on re-entering the amount rather than offering the choices.
• In the Deposit service, the amount for depositing is required not to be over 1,000,000 Japanese yen, but the program does not implement this constraint, therefore allowing any amount to be deposited in one service.
In the three errors, we found that the first one was relatively easier to find, but the second and the third ones took us more efforts to find out, because the missing functions did not cause fundamental problem in providing the services, and therefore did not easily attract the tester's attention. The tester's attention was actually raised by examining the corresponding defining condition in the post-condition of the operations. This result shows that formal specification does benefit testing in our approach.
The result of this case study has shown the usefulness and effectiveness of our testing approach, but at the same time we also found two major challenges. One is how to ensure that all of the possible interface scenarios can be discovered using limited test cases. The other is with the writing of formal specifications. Both requires the tester to be skillful in testing and formal specification techniques. Our experience suggests that these challenges can be overcome through a systematic training. Since a growing number of practitioners become interested in formal specification techniques [2], it is possible to let high level testing consultants specialize in our method (including formal specification techniques). Further development in powerful tool support for requirements formalization will also help to deal with the challenges.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our work falls into the category of model-based testing (MBT), but differs from existing approaches in the way of deriving models. In this section, we briefly overview the related work in this area and compared it to our approach.
There have been extensive research on and application of MBT over the last three decades [5] , and the work can be classified into four categories: general discussion of MBT, MBT based upon graphical models, MBT based on formal specifications, and automation in MBT. EI-Far and Whittaker give a general introduction to model-based testing in [6] , discussing its underlying principle, process, and techniques. Apfelbaum and Doyle argue that a finite state machine MBT can reduce cost and time, and can increase software quality, but pointed out that the technique also faces challenges in acceptance [7] . Offutt et at describe an approach to generating test cases from UML Statecharts for components testing [8] .
Hartmann et at extend the approach for integration testing and provide effective tool support for test automation [9] . Bemot et at set up a theoretical foundation and a tool sup port for specification-based testing, explaining how a formal specification can serve as a base for test case generation and as an oracle for test result evaluation [10] . Dick and Faivre propose to transform pre-condition into a disjunctive normal form (DNF) and then use it as the basis for test case generation [11] . Stocks and Carrington suggest that test templates be defined as the base for test case generation and a large test template is divided into smaller templates for generating more detailed test cases [12] . In order to deal with the practical challenges MBT techniques have encountered due to the inconsistency between the component interfaces in the model and in the program, Blackburn et al present an interface driven MBT approach that combines requirement modeling and component interface analysis to support automated test case and test driver generation [13] . In spite of tremendous efforts by many researchers, MBT is still difficult to be used for large scale systems because of its complexity and the potential inconsistencies in both component interface and system architectures. It is also unsuitable for testing programs, such as legacy code, which do not have source code available.
To tackle this problem, Bertolino et al describe an anti-model based testing approach in [14] . The essential idea of this approach shares with our testing approach presented in this paper; it suggests to use some test cases to execute the program under test and observe the traces of executions, and then try to synthesize and abstract model of the system. Compared to our work in this paper, Bertolino et al neither advocate the use of formalization for the abstract model, nor discuss in detail about how all the necessary traces are observed and represented and how the traces are synthesized into an abstract model. Our novel contribution in this paper is to present a systematic method for identifying all interface scenarios, formalizing requirements into formal operation specifications whose interfaces are consistent with the corresponding ones of the program, and for testing based upon the formal speci fications.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present a systematic approach to testing programs with no available source code. The approach includes three steps:
(1) identifying all interface scenarios by executing the program with test cases, (2) formalizing the informal requirements into formal specifications, and (3) generating test cases from the formal specifications to test the program. The benefit of our testing approach is to allow the tester to thoroughly understand the desired behaviors of the system and to provide a precise model for testing it. We have also applied our approach to an IC Card system to gain experience and to learn potential challenges in practice.
In the future, we will continue to work along the direction set in this paper to make the testing approach more mature and effective. In particular, we will refine and improve the techniques for discovering interface scenarios, formalizing user requirements, and generating test cases. To enhance the efficiency of testing activities, we will also work on the tool support.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGE MENT
This research is supported in part by NIl Collaborative Research Program, 973 program Grant No.2010CB328102, and NSFC under Grant Nos. 61133001, 60910004. We would like to thank all the students involved in this project for their contributions to the application of the testing approach and cooperations in data collection.
